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1“One does not have to spent long in Bosnia, or Gaza or the lakes
district in Africa to know that without economic hope we will not have
global security. Without a better sense of social justice our cities will
not be safe and our societies will not be stable. Without inclusion, to
many of us will be condemned to live separate, armed and frightened
lives”.
_____James D. Wolfensonh,
President
World Bank Group
Annual Meeting
1997, Hong Kong.
2BRIEF SURVEY OF HISTORICAL, ETHNIC, SOCIAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
CONFLICT ZONES IN GEORGIA AND THE CAUCASUS
The Caucasus region is clearly one of the most troubled areas of the Newly Independent States
(NIS), with an unmatched level of ethnic and cultural diversity that is overwhelmed by internal
contractions, societal and economic problems, and widespread suffering resulting from
numerous military conflicts.
Sadly, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – which collectively form the so-called
“Transcaucasian” countries- face a new century carrying the weight of both respective and
intertwined histories. The region is one of the great historical crossroads of the Western
Hemisphere. As such, all three nations have long suffered from the expansionist designs of their
relatively enormous neighbors, especially Iran, Turkey and Russia.
All three Trancaucasian countries have been devastated by warfare since each declared
independence in 1991.Georgia has seen almost a fifth of its territory taken over by secessionist
movement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And Armenia and Azerbaijan have not yet resolved
their mutual claims to Nagorno-Khrabakh. Two years of all-out war cost over 20,000 lives
before a tenuous, largely Russian-brokered peace agreement between the two countries was
reached in 1994.
The Trancaucasian nations might well be fated to offer the world a tragic example of how
smaller; weaker states are so rarely allowed to compete on anything vaguely like a level playing
field. On the other hand, they could stand to benefit enormously from their location at the
crossroad of Europe, southern Russia and the Middle East.
Comprehensive sub regional cooperation among three South Caucasian states is impossible
before relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Abkhazia, etc. are finally settled.
Acceptance into Western Institutions like the Council of Europe are seen by many as one of the
most positive developments that could happen at this stage of Transcaucasian social and political
development. Many view such steps as vital for democratization processes as much as for social
and economic efforts to move further into line with established Western-especially European
standards.
Since 1988, Transcaucasia and parts of the North Caucasus has been the scene of turmoil. There
have been numerous latent and overt claims and counterclaims concerning national statehood,
administrative status, ethnic identity and borders. Never before, since the turbulent period of
1918-21, which followed the fall of the Russian empire, have conflicts raged with such deadly
animosity. Old ethnic wounds have reopened, leading in some cases to sustained warfare, in
others to ethnic strife punctuated by intermittent clashes.
Geopolitical changes in the region have been one of the main underlying causes of ethnic
conflicts. Just as in 1918-21, when the Caucasian conflicts followed the demise of the Russian
empire, these have come on the heels of the weakening and then break-up of the USSR.
Geopolitics is a function of the vital interests of states and societies. Thus the Warsaw Pact
3served the purpose of preserving the social system and securing the socio-economic development
of the coalition, by repelling the perceived threat from the West. With the defeat of the Soviet
Union in the Cold War, these interests changed abruptly, and a reorientation of the Eastern bloc's
ruling elites to Western-type free-market economies ensued. The weakening of communist
control from the Center put an end to common ideological interests shared between the different
national elites. These persuaded public opinion in their countries that a transition to a free-market
economy, personal freedom and Western aid could better be ensured by economic and political
sovereignty. For the elites of the titular nationalities of the Trancaucasian republics, breaking
loose from the influence of Moscow became a priority. The federal division of the USSR - in
particular, the existence of higher- and lower-ranking administrative units based on ethnic and
territorial principles - became an impediment to the titular elites' national projects. These projects
manifested themselves in attempts to create (or, in the case of Armenia, which was nearly 90%
Armenian-populated by 1988, to consolidate) statehood on an ethnic basis. In Georgia, this
national project collided with the separate statehood, language and cultural interests of the
Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazian ASSR) and of the South Ossetian
Autonomous Oblast (South Ossetian AO). Azerbaijan was confronted with the problem of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) region, populated mainly by Armenians. In
Armenia, the perceived injustice of the international treaties of the early 1920s, which ensured
border divisions within the region, reinforced the Armenian determination to hold on to
Karabakh, viewed as the only part of historic Armenia outside the republic's borders still
populated by an Armenian majority. It might be added that, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the
national movements did not start out as anti-Soviet, but initially included demands for the
Kremlin to ensure the validity of their respective national claims: in the case of Armenia, for the
NKAO to be attached to it, and in the case of Azerbaijan, to prevent this. It was the inability of
the Kremlin to satisfy these demands that set the movements in both republics on a path of
independence.
An institutional vacuum was created as titular nations asserted their rights. The nationalism of
larger nationalities found a counterpart in the nationalism of national minorities. National
minorities, concerned for their security and survival, mobilized their own populations, tried to
ensure exclusive administrative control over their territory and appealed for help to the Center, to
kindred ethnicities across the border and/or to neighboring republics; they set up paramilitary
formations, and expelled "foreign" nationals along with government troops sent to subdue the
"rebels".
To explain why conflicts break out, geopolitics and socio-economic interests alone are not
enough. A salient factor in the conflicts under discussion is the use of history in the service of
particular nationalist demands. Thus, in Abkhaz literature, one finds references to the Abkhazian
kingdom which existed in the 9th and 10th centuries. This is instrumental to the Abkhazian claim
for sovereignty over the region, even though the same kingdom could equally be described as a
common Georgian-Abkhazian state, with a predominance of Georgian language and culture.
The Ossetian-Ingushi conflict stands apart from the basic pattern we have just outlined. This is
not a case of a national minority struggling to preserve its existing autonomy within a dominant
titular nation, but a dispute over parts of the region, which have seen, repeated border changes
and forcible population transfers within them. In other words, it is not a conflict over ethnic
status, but a purely territorial dispute.
4The interests involved in gaining sovereignty and statehood can submerge socio-economic
interests. In Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, no price seemed too high in the national cause.
The predominance within national elites of particular groups, such as leaders of military
formations, criminal mafias and war profiteers, did little to favor a peaceful solution to ethnic
conflicts.
Some regional leaders realized that the price paid for sovereignty had been too high. President of
Georgia Mr. Shevardnadze and President of Azerbaijan Mr. Aliyev stopped ignoring economic
and military factors and turned to their traditional partner, Russia. They did so while, at the same
time, preserving other, newly found regional partners and striving to avoid the less palatable
elements of their former relationship with their northern neighbor. This new opening up to
Russia, together with the political activities of new regional states like Iran and Turkey and the
policies of international organizations, has created new possibilities for crisis management in
conflicts.
The validity of the right to self-determination, as against the principle of the territorial integrity
of states, is a thorny issue, and one which finds no satisfactory solution among the protagonists
in the conflicts within the former Soviet Union. Contemporary international law recognizes the
right of independence for colonial peoples and annexed territories, but not for parts of such
territories, nor for national minorities in internationally recognized states. This is designed to
prevent wars between nations whose borders have been demarcated, often disregarding the
ethnic composition of the territories in question, by former colonial and imperial powers.
Another reason is to safeguard the rights of "minorities within minorities" and protect them from
ethnic cleansing. Taken in the ex-Soviet context, the principle of territorial integrity has been
invoked primarily by the countries newly admitted to membership of the UN, whose
independence has been internationally recognized (Georgia, Azerbaijan) and by autonomous
republics whose borders - and not status - are contested (North Ossetia). Georgia and Azerbaijan
invoked this principle when they revoked the Soviet-era status of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Nagorno-Karabakh. The declarations of independence by the latter group of republics have not
been recognized by the international community, although the UN de facto recognizes Abkhazia
as a negotiating partner by sponsoring peace talks in Geneva between it and Georgia. The
Abkhaz, South Ossetes and Karabakh Armenians, who do not "qualify" for independence
according to UN principles, invoke the right to self-determination and consequently seek the
support of regional players.
Major Conflicts
Abkhazia
In the northwestern corner of Georgia lie the 3,300 square miles of snow-capped mountains and
subtropical coastline that form the territory of Abkhazia.
INTRODUCTION
Abkhazia (Apsny, "a Country of the Soul" in the Abkhaz language, Abkhazia in Georgian), an
autonomous republic of Georgia is situated in the northwestern part of Georgia on the Black Sea
coast. The Abkhaz are a people close in language and origin to the North Caucasian peoples of
the Adyghe group. Although they lived under Turkish rule from the late 15th to the early 19th
5centuries and some of them were converted to Islam during that period, there are few Moslems
now left in Abkhazia. The Abkhaz population underwent Christianization in the late 19th
century, under Russian rule. The territory of the present-day republic was once part of Ancient
Rome, Byzantium and Persia. Later, Arabs, Genoese colonists, Turks and Russians sought to
control it. Until Abkhazia's absorption by Russia in 1810, Abkhazian rulers were in nominal or
effective vassalage or union with various (although often separate) Georgian kingdoms and
princedoms. So the historical evidence is ambiguous: both unity with Georgia and autonomy can
be argued on historical grounds.
During the 1920s, Abkhazia enjoyed the status of a full Soviet Socialist Republic, only to see
itself reduced a decade later to an autonomous republic within Georgia. With the decline of
Soviet central power in the late 1980s, Abkhazia intensified its demands for more cultural,
linguistic, and political autonomy from Tbilisi. Georgia rejected these demands and from August
1992 through September 1993, Tbilisi waged an unsuccessful war with Abkhazia. Thousands of
civilians were killed, and hundreds of thousands fled the fighting. As of April 1995, some
250,000 people from Abkhazia, mostly ethnic Georgians, were internally displaced in Georgia.
The capital of Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia is Sokhumi. Towns – Gagra, Gali, Gudauta,
Ochamchire, etc.
The territory of Abkhazia is 8,7 thousand sq. km, somewhat smaller than Cyprus. This makes up
12.5% of Georgia. Only coastal areas and foothills, characterized by a mild subtropical climate,
are populated and cultivated. The rest of the country consists of high mountains and deep
ravines.
Prior to the war, the total population of Abkhazia was roughly 537,000, with just under 100,000
people of ethnic Abkhaz origin. Historically, the Abkhaz people allied themselves with the
Russian-speaking population (notably Russians and Armenians). Together, these groups
comprised roughly half of the region’s population. Ethnic Georgians comprised some 46 percent
of the population.
According to the last Soviet census of 1989, the population of Abkhazia was somewhat 537
thousand. The main population groups were the Georgians (242,3 thousand, 45.7%), Abkhazians
(93,3 thousand, 17.8%), Armenians (76,5 thousand, 14.6%), Russians (74,4 thousand, 14.3%)
and Greeks (14,7 thousand, 2.8%).
6During the conflict in 1992-1993 70% of the population were forced to leave this territory. Most
of the refugees have been living in various Georgian regions since 1993.
ECONOMY
During the Soviet times, Abkhazia was one of the most prosperous regions of the former Soviet
Union. The national economy was based on agriculture, light industry, mining, electric power
production, and tourism. The main agricultural products were citrus fruits, tea, tobacco, oil-
bearing plants, olives, figs, nuts, laurel leaf, wine and other beverages, honey, and cheese.
Forestry and fishery were also of importance. In the Soviet times, Abkhazia met up to 20% of the
USSR's demand for tea. Abkhazian peasants produced more than 120,000 tons of citrus fruits
(mostly mandarins), 110,000 tons of tea leaves, up to 14,000 tons of aromatic tobacco, some
14,000 tons of grapes. For the most part, these products were exported. Light industry
manufactured copy machines, gas-bags, radios and telephones, mixed feed for cattle, chemical
products, textiles, and shoes. There were coal mining and house-building plants besides.
Abkhazia's economy was oriented mainly towards the huge Soviet market, its economical
cooperation with Georgia being prominent only in the energy and transport sectors.
The subtropical nature of Abkhazia, the high snow-covered mountains and the warm Black Sea
used to attract hundreds of thousands of tourists every year. Hotels and sanatoriums could
accommodate up to 25,000 visitors at once. The private sector was also oriented toward
providing accommodation for tourists. The famous high-elevation lake Ritsa was visited by
10,000 tourists daily. The cave at New Athos, one of the deepest in the world, was seen by 3,000
people a day.
Today, Abkhazia produces a grim picture.
Of all the conflict regions, Abkhazia is now in the most miserable condition, in spite of its richly
coastal territory reaching up to the Russian Frontier. The 1989-19998 conflict led not only to
massive destruction, but also to depopulation of Abkhaiza’s fertile southern part, formerly
populated by ethnic Georgians.
The lush nature cannot conceal burned and destroyed houses, schools and kindergartens, looted
factories, blown-up bridges, roads and tunnels. The majority of the enterprises are at a standstill
now. Many plants are destroyed. For the rest, there are no supplies of raw materials, and no cash
to pay the workers' salaries.
In the agricultural sector, many plantations and farms have been destroyed by the war, and their
restoration and re-cultivation will need no fewer than 6-7 years of work and appropriate levels of
investment
The overall damage inflicted to the economy of Abkhazia by the war amounts, by Abkhazian
estimates, to more than US$100bln in current prices. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
1994 was US$60.3mln, which, compared with 692.5mln in 1988, makes up only 14% of the pre-
war level. Exports of citrus fruits, tea, and tobacco have plummeted to less than 19% of their
1989 levels. Industrial production has declined by 93.2%, gross agricultural production by
75.3%, and per capita income by 90%.
Material destruction can be repaired or replaced, but the human losses are irreparable. The
wartime human losses of the Abkhazian side are estimated at 5,000, the majority of them
7between 18 and 40 years of age. Apart from those who perished, 1256 young people became
disabled. More than 6,000 children became orphans, and most of them suffer from post-
traumatic stress disorders. All these people, the invalids and the disabled, the children and the
elderly, badly need qualified medical care and psychological rehabilitation, food and medicines,
prostheses and wheelchairs. All of these are in very short supply. Despite urgent needs, most of
the international humanitarian and financial aid destined for the post-Soviet states, in particular,
for Georgia, do not reach the civilian population of Abkhazia.
POLITICAL STATUS
The status of Abkhazia is still the subject of negotiation between the warring parties, with
participation from the Russian Federation and the United Nations. In November 1994, the
Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia adopted a constitution declaring Abkhazia an independent state, but
the UN Security Council has reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of Georgia. Meanwhile, a CIS peacekeeping force (PKF), comprised
mostly of Russians, and a 136-member international military observation force from the United
Nations have helped to prevent the resumption of full-scale fighting since the agreement on a
cease-fire and separation of forces was signed in Moscow on May 14, 1994.
South Ossetia
In the very heart of the Georgia is situated Tskhinvali / South Ossetia.
At an altitude of 1000 meters and more above the sea level is to be found 89,3 % of the territory
of South Ossetia. The mountain landscape also determined largely South Ossetia's climate. It is
shielded against the cold northern winds by the Main Caucasus Range, which results in the fact
that even at great heights it is warmer here than in the Northern Caucasus.
Along with them in South Ossetia reside Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, - a total of 40
nationalities.
As of 1989, the autonomous oblast of South Ossetia within Georgia had a population of nearly
100,000, of whom 66.2% were Ossetes and 29% Georgians. Along with them in South Ossetia
reside Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, - a total of 40 nationalities. Half of the families
in the region were of mixed Georgian-Ossetian descent. The Ossetes are descendants of the
ancient Alan tribes of Iranian stock. Some of them are Orthodox Christians and some (in certain
regions of North Ossetia) are Moslems.
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On 20 April 1922, after the Sovietization of Georgia in 1921, the South Ossetian Autonomous
Oblast (AO) was formed. Georgian writers have claimed that, like the Abkhazian ASSR, the
South Ossetian AO had been formed by the Bolsheviks to create permanent sources of tension,
so as to enable the Kremlin to control Georgia more easily. Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia
were said to be run on an ethnocratic basis, to the detriment of Georgian national interests.
Hence the perceived Georgian need to curtail if not abolish these autonomous entities. The
response from the South Ossetes was either to try to secure federal status within Georgia or,
failing that, to seek to be reunited with North Ossetia, forming part of Russia.
Words and concepts have played an important role in the development of the conflict. The term
"South Ossetia", for instance, has never been accepted by the Georgian side, as it seems to
prompt demands for reunification with North Ossetia, which is a part of the Russian Federation.
The term "South Ossetia" was used in the 19th century in a cultural/geographical sense, but the
area was granted administrative status only under communist rule. Although the rural population
of the region has been predominantly Ossetian for the past few centuries, the Georgians consider
the region a Georgian historical province, called Shida Kartli (Inner Kartli) or Samachablo,
(Land of the Machabeli, from the name of the Georgian feudal family which allegedly ruled it),
the Tskhinvali region.
Conflicts in South Ossetia became a political issue as a result of an attempt by the South
Ossetian Supreme Soviet to upgrade the status of the AO. On 10 November 1989, it approved a
decision to transform the AO into the South Ossetian ASSR, which would form part of Georgia.
In a day, the Georgian parliament revoked the South Ossetian parliament's decision. The first
stage of the conflict lasted from November 1989 to January 1990.
On 26 April 1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a law providing for a notable enhancement
of the rights of Soviet autonomies. By so doing, the Centre encouraged the autonomies to fight
for their sovereignty against the majority in some multinational Union republics striving for
independence (Moldova, Georgia). But instead of giving the autonomies effective protection, it
merely played them against the nationalistic currents in those republics, thus paving the way for
political and military interference in their affairs by the Kremlin.
The South Ossetian demand for the establishment of treaty relations between South Ossetia and
Georgia was not accepted, though the Ossetian-populated districts have remained out of bounds
for Georgia. The question of the status of South Ossetia has not been solved to this day.
South Ossetia, a land that seems to have been forgotten by the outside world: no ties with
Georgia, and hence no supplies from there; almost no attempt made (for lack of financial
resources) to rebuild what has been destroyed in the war; factories idle, with the population
engaged in subsistence farming. In September 1993, Ludvig Chibirov, a colleague of North
Ossetian leader Galazov, became Chairman of the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet, later renamed
State Nykhas (Council of Elders); elections to that body held in March 1994 gave the South
Ossetian Communist Party 19 seats out of 36. In October 1994, Shevardnadze admitted that the
conflict in South Ossetia had been the grossest mistake of the former Georgian leadership, and
diplomatic efforts to solve the refugee problem were stepped up by the Georgian and South
Ossetian sides.
9There are two main reasons why conflicts like the one in South Ossetia were hard to avoid in the
process of the breaking-up of the Soviet Union.
The first is that the absence of a civic consciousness, which expressed itself in an opposition
between the concepts of citizenship and nationality. Nationality was considered to be a purely
ethnic and non-political characteristic of individuals and groups, while citizenship, on the
contrary, was seen as a mainly external relationship linking individuals and groups with the state.
This opposition between nationality and citizenship was reinforced by the Soviet system of
passport registration,which had a special entry for an individual's nationality as distinct from his
or her citizenship. After the demise of the Soviet Union, it was difficult for both majorities and
minorities in the newly independent republics to consider their belonging to new nations in a
non-ethnic sense. Since 1988, the Georgian media has presented the issue of Georgian
nationhood in predominantly ethnic terms.
Despite all the manifestations of ethnic nationalism, almost nobody questioned the cultural rights
of the minorities (such as the possibility of having an education, theatres, newspapers, etc., in
their own languages). The political elite generally understood the need to consolidate the
independence movement across ethnic lines, and consequently encouraged minority
representatives to participate in pro-independence parties and movements. Of course, the
representation of minorities in the national independence movement was not proportional to its
numeric importance in the population, but, even though its participation may be regarded as
rather symbolic, it was nevertheless important in counter-balancing the impact of ethnic
nationalism.
The second reason why conflicts like this were hard to prevent from reaching the violent stage
was that territory, or "soil" was at stake. The newly independent states contained disputed
territories, which were claimed by different ethnic communities as "theirs". It was these
conflicting territorial claims, more than the alleged mistreatment of minorities by the majority,
which lay at the heart of conflicts like those in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh.
Mistreatment of or discrimination against minorities were used by the advocates of secessionism
in order to mobilize their own communities or to gain recognition for their cause from the
international community. And public opinion in modern democratic states is indeed sensitive to
arguments that can be translated into the language of "minority rights".
In the case of Georgia, the allegations of the secessionist politicians from Abkhazia or South
Ossetia were generally based on particular statements by some Georgian politicians or on
reminiscences of ethnic strife in the past.The Abkhaz and the Ossetes reacted negatively to the
first actions by the Georgian independence movement because, as they said, the flag of the
Georgian Republic of 1918-21, banned during the Soviet years but raised again by the new
opposition movement, "reminded them of their ancestors killed under that flag".
The abolition of South Ossetian autonomy by the Georgian Parliament in December 1990 was an
unwise political move (unwise as its only predictable result would be violent clashes, giving
Russia further legitimation for intervening militarily in Georgian affairs and ultimately
contributing to South Ossetia's de facto separation from Georgia), but it should also be seen as an
ill-considered retaliation for the declaration by the "South Ossetian Democratic Republic" of its
separation from Georgia, which had been made several days before. What ensued was a
territorial war in which both sides were defending "their land" and which the absence of regular
armies made even more brutal.
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In addition to ethnic nationalism and historical territorial claims, Russian involvement and its
perception by the Georgian side may be considered a third decisive factor which helps explain
the eruption of violence in South Ossetia. From the point of view shared by most Georgians, it
was Russia (or the Kremlin "Centre") that orchestrated all the ethnic conflicts in Georgia, as well
as in other areas of the former Soviet empire. This political support from Moscow was a factor
which encouraged the minority movements in Georgia to be uncompromising in dealing with
their local "centre". It also goes a long way towards explaining the Georgian independence
movement's insensitivity to minority concerns. The Ossetians - like the Abkhaz separatists - were
seen not as fighting for their own rights, but as siding with "them" (the Kremlin) against "us"
(Georgia). The Ossetians were branded as "ungrateful and treacherous guests". The more the
minorities counted on support from the "centre", the more the majority denounced them for
doing so, in their turn prompting the minorities to seek protection from Moscow. The warring
parties failed to find an exit from this vicious spiral.
Moderate tendencies within the Ossetian movement had understood very well that secession
from Georgia was a reckless move. Compromises with the Georgian government would have
been possible, insofar as public opinion in Georgia had never opposed granting quite extensive
cultural rights to the minorities. Only some groups within the Georgian independence movement
attempted to co-operate with these moderate tendencies within the national minorities (this
included the Ilia Chavchavadze Society in the years 1987-89, and supporters of the National
Congress who invited minority movements to their session in May 1990). Unfortunately, such
attempts were rare and inconsistent. 
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CAUCASUS REGION
International organizations have increased interest in regional conflict resolution, but financial
assistance does not work well. The amount spent and results produced are unequal.
The World Bank
The aftermath of growing conflicts in the 1990s has tested the ability of the international
community to address the devastation of economic, human and social capital. The World Bank
has increased the volume of its lending to post-conflict countries by mire than 800 percent since
1980, with reconstruction operation touching every region and economic sector.
The bank’s reconstruction lending projects have covered every sector, with the largest portion,
33 percent, supporting “multi-sector” projects.
In 1997 the Bank endorsed A Framework for World Bank Involvement in Post-Conflict
Reconstruction to guide work in post-conflict countries. The Bank subsequently set up the Post-
conflict Unit (PCU), which serves as a focal point for policy development and cross-country
learning.
The Bank’s working presence is critical in the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction. The
Bank is valuable in external Aid coordination, which is important in the transition from war to
World Bank Lending to Georgia since 
1992 as of July 2001 (in US$ millions)
277
105
54
50
39
28
2624 1514114
Economic policy Energy
Transportation Agriculture
Urban Development Public sector management
Education Social Protection
Provate sector development Health, nutration
Oil &Gas Environment
World Bank Lending to Armenia since 
1992 as of July 2001 (in US$ millions)
250
8477
71
35
32
30 28
1715 108
Economic policy Agriculture
Public sector management Transportation
Energy Social Protection
Water supply Urban Development
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peace.
World Bank Lending to Georgia by Sector since 1992
(in nearest US$ millions)
As of July, 2001
Economic Policy 277
Electric Power & Energy 105
Transportation 54
Agriculture 50
Urban Development 39
Public Sector Management 28
Education 26
Social Protection 24
Private Sector Development 15
Health, Nutrition & Population 14
Oil & Gas 11
Environment 4
Total 648
World Bank Lending to Armenia by Sector since 1992
(in nearest US$ millions)
 As of July 2001
Economic Policy 250
Agriculture 84
Public Sector Management 77
Transportation 71
Electric Power & Energy 35
Social Protection 32
Water Supply and Sanitation 30
Urban Development 28
Private Sector Development 17
Education 15
Health, Nutrition & Population 10
Environment 8
Total 658
World Bank Lending to Azerbaijan since 
1992 as of July, 2001 (in US$ millions)
142
8761
41
20
20
18
18 5 55
40
Economic policy Agriculture
Water supply Oil &Gas
Transportation Environment
Urban Development Private sector management
Social protection Finance
Education Health, nutration
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World Bank Lending to Azerbaijan by Sector since 1992
(in nearest US$ millions)
As of July 2001
Economic Policy 142
Agriculture 87
Water Supply & Sanitation 61
Oil and Gas 41
Transportation 40
Environment 20
Urban Development 20
Private Sector Development 18
Social Protection 18
Education 5
Finance 5
Health, Nutrition & Population 5
Total 462
TRACECA
The EU supports two big cooperative projects: TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe –
Caucasus-Asia) and INOGATE. Within them, the UE has supported a number of specific events
and activities, for example the construction of POTI-Illichevsk ferry project (between Georgian
and Ukraine), the highway in Turkmenistan and them oil-terminal in Baku. The EU has also
encouraged close cooperation between TRACECA and the BSEC, particularly the joint
BSEC_TRACECA conference.
One of the main objectives of the TRACECA program is to act as a catalyst to attract the support
of International Financial Institutions and private investors. In order to respond to the demand of
potential international financial investors the TRACECA program has carried out full feasibility
studies, preliminary financial investigation, and developed business plans for potential
infrastructure and equipment investment.
Status of projects and the future prospects
In order to examine the possibilities of linking the TRACECA route with the Black Sea region
and the TENs, the EU organized in April 1997 a ministerial transport conference in Tbilisi,
Georgia. The conference brought around the table all BSEC (Black Sea Economic Co-operation)
countries and Newly Independent States involved in the Traceca programme.
The ministers of the 16 participating countries expressed the wish to integrate TRACECA and
the Black Sea countries within the Trans European Networks. It was agreed that TRACECA and
BSEC would co-operate closely to develop this idea by concrete actions and projects. Several
countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine) used the occasion to declare their intention to join the
Saraks Agreement, which aims at establishing a common policy on transport (the original
agreement was concluded between Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).
The Conference resulted in the establishment of a Ministerial Committee for the development of
concrete projects and also served as a platform of 16 countries for the Pan European Transport
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Conference in Helsinki in June 1997. As a result the Helsinki Conference identified the Black
Sea Region as a Pan European Transport Area (PETRA) which will further develop the TENs to
the East.
In order to give substance to the idea of the Black Sea Region as a Pan European Transport Area,
the EU agreed to finance the rehabilitation of the Ro-Ro ferry terminal in the port of Ilyichevsk
(Ukraine) and the construction of a Ro-Ro ferry terminal in the port of Poti (Georgia). These
projects (15 Mecu) will be implemented in 1998 and finalized at the beginning of 1999. In
addition, the project proposals of the Fourth Working Group have been translated in 2 TA
studies and 2 investments projects, worth 10 Mecu, to be implemented in 1998.
In September 1997 there was a welcome initiative by Presidents Aliev of Azerbaijan and
Shevardnadze of Georgia who jointly proposed to host a presidential conference in the Caucasus
early in 1998, that could lead to the adoption of the draft multilateral agreements on transport
initiated within the TRACECA programme. These agreements could break open the existing
Sarakhs agreement, a four-country agreement on the reduction of railway tariffs in order to
facilitate the transit of cargo by railways. The formulated proposals include: an additional
number of commodities for railways, to open it for other transport modes, to harness the interest
of other countries that are interested by the agreement.
Consideration is currently being given to the prospect of further Working Group meetings to
draw together the initiatives taken so far, to consolidate these actions and to make plans for
future actions.
TRACECA has always worked in close co-operation with the IFIs and many agreements have
been made with Word Bank and the EBRD. These include:
The construction of highways in Turkmenistan, with the technical assistance (TA) for 0.75
million ECU being financed by the EU for the feasibility and design of two highways prior to a
$80 million EBRD loan.
The rehabilitation of Baku Port with TA financed by the EU for 1.5 million ECU for the
feasibility and design of a ferry terminal to be reconstructed with a $50 million EBRD loan.
The rehabilitation of Turkmenbashi Port with TA financed by the EU for 1.5 million ECU for the
design study and preparation of the tender for the ferry terminal prior to a $50 million EBRD
loan.
The upgrading of roads in Armenia with TA financed by the EU for 0.75 million ECU in order to
provide the TA package for the second half of the $40 million WB/EBRD loan.
Construction of the Poti Grain Terminal with TA financed by the EU for 0.4 million ECU for the
legal issues on the concession of the terminal, to be constructed after a $15 million EBRD loan.
The modernisation of the Georgian Ports with preliminary discussions on the construction of
ferry terminals and general cargo facilities from an investment by EBRD following a TA
package of 1.5 million ECU financed by the EU
Road rehabilitation in Georgia where a TA package of 0.4 million ECU was financed by the EU
for a WB loan of $13 million.
As TRACECA now includes direct investment projects as well as TA, we are to maintain
complementarity of actions with the IFI and act as a co-financer rather than a substitute donor.
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The objectives of investment projects therefore still include the stimulation of participation by
others. This is achieved when potential revenue streams from TRACECA investments add to and
enhance the overall investment attraction of a larger package including an IFI.
The EU continues to provide support to projects that receive funding from other sources and
these include:
Rehabilitation of the Caucasian Railways for 5 million ECU : An investment project in the
framework of the Food Aid operation for the Caucasus in 1995. The intensive use of the
Caucasian railways under the 204 Mecu food aid-operation by EU had led to the exhaustion of
rolling stock and rail track. The project financed the rehabilitation of 7.5 km of track in Georgia,
the reparation of the section Airum-Yerevan (Armenia border with Georgia), the rehabilitation of
the bridge of Poyle (Azeri border with Georgia).
Air Traffic Control (ATC) Training and Southern Ring Air Routes for 5 million ECU: A
regional project in 10 countries to upgrade ATC capabilities and to support the establishment of
a rational workplan for routes to be adapted by airlines. The project includes a feasibility study
for the three national Caucasian airlines to set up a joint venture for regional flights with
investment opportunities for private European investors.
INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe): A programme which aims to
rehabilitate and modernise existing oil and gas transmission grid and facilities in the NIS, to
assess options for possible alternative routes, to strengthen regional co-operation in oil and gas
pipeline management and institution building.
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